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ABSTRACT  
In this paper we develop a framework for macro stress testing of China’s banking 
system. Our estimates of the correlations between banks’ stability indicators and 
macroeconomic factors establish significant relationships between the non-performing 
loan ratio and key macroeconomic variables, such as GDP growth, the retail price index 
(RPI), the unemployment rate, total fixed investment, the money supply, interest rates, 
and exchange rates. Further, results from the macro stress tests show that robustness, 
or otherwise, of the banking system is highly dependent on the source of the potential 
risk. Our value-at-risk tests suggest that (at a 99% confidence level) the Chinese 
banking system is robust with respect to interest rate shocks. However, GDP growth 
and exchange rate shocks exhibit a profound negative effect, indicating that significant 
losses become likely. These results should inform investors, policy-makers and 
regulators with regard to loss-limitation in China’s banking system. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In recent years banks have engaged in increasingly complex and diverse international financial 
activities. The role of banks, as one of the most important financial intermediaries in an 
economy, and as a prerequisite for sustainable economic growth, reinforces the fact that 
instability in the banking system would be costly for the real economy. This is manifest by the 
myriad ways the current Global Financial Crisis (GFC) has impacted economies (e.g. 
Tagkalakis, 2013; Aboody et al., 2014).1, 2 In particular, the costs and losses, at the national 
level, associated with failures within the banking system, underscore the need for supervision 
with a macro-prudential perspective, particularly with regard to how banks measure and control 
their risk exposure.  
 From the macro-prudential perspective, the Basel III Accord emphasized the need for the 
development of a more robust stress-testing approach compared to Basel II.3-6 The emphasis 
suggests that up-to-date risk management techniques —particularly, ‘macro stress-testing’ — 
have become effective tools in assessing stability of the banking system, and the financial 
system more broadly (see Sorge, 2004).7 This is especially so from the perspective of central 
banks, where stress tests are a prudent technique alongside the traditional regulation methods 
used to assess risk exposure in the financial system (Marcelo et al., 2008).8 
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In this paper we focus on macro stress testing in assessing financial stability in China, and 
we address two questions that naturally arise. First, how should we measure the potential risks 
in the banking system? Secondly, how do we quantify the vulnerability of the banking system 
to potential risks? To achieve answers to these, we develop a framework for macro stress testing 
of credit exposures in the Chinese banking system. Our empirical analysis adopts a vector 
autoregression (VAR) approach, and investigates the relationship between the ratio of non-
performing bank loans and key macroeconomic factors, such as GDP growth, RPI, the 
unemployment rate, fixed investment, real estate price indexes, the money supply, interest rates, 
and the exchange rate. Macro stress testing assesses the credit risk of banks’ overall loan 
portfolios and mortgage exposures by mapping multivariate scenarios against potential risks. 
The test introduces different types of macroeconomic shocks into the scenarios, which are 
designed to replicate those that have occurred in past financial crises and stochastic simulations. 
The present study is thus predicated on the following: first, stress-testing has become an 
integral part of banks’ risk management assessments; second, in interpreting the results of stress 
tests, many banks create a link between market shocks and banks’ responses. Interestingly, in 
China, which is an emergent global economy, stress testing is still at the embryonic stage. On 
this basis, we posit that the analysis contained herein is timely and contributes to our 
understanding of this very important emerging market economy. 
 
2. BACKGROUND 
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Previous literature and the experience of the GFC has shown that many financial institutions 
can experience large losses. Stulz (2008)9 argues that a large loss is not necessarily a 
consequence of risk-management failure, because large losses can happen even if risk 
management is stringent. In other words, the common task of daily risk management cannot 
completely rule out extreme exposure to losses. This notwithstanding, the recent GFC has also 
highlighted serious deficiencies in traditional risk management models (e.g. Huang et al., 2009; 
Aizenman et al., 2012)10,11 and underscores the necessity for improvements in risk management 
systems, and the adoption of improved risk-management measures to better depict the possible 
risks. This is why stress tests and scenario analysis are apposite. 
Moreover, regulators need to provide a clearer definition of financial stability and the 
framework to achieve this goal. Recently, regulators have charged banks with the responsibility 
of ensuring a sound, stable and efficient banking system as a whole, i.e. financial stability, rather 
than only assuring the soundness of their own bank (Borio, 2006).12 Financial stability depends, 
in essence, on the prudential regulation and effective supervision which was instituted in 1999 
by the IMF and the World Bank via the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP). 
Although there is no single generally accepted definition of financial stability, Marcelo et 
al. suggest that ‘for a given economy, [financial stability] provides sufficient assurance that the 
efficiency of intermediation between the suppliers and demanders of funds (broadly speaking, 
between investors and savers) will not be significantly affected by adverse events (shocks)’ 
(2008, p.65).8 Given the huge negative implications for the real economy in the event of 
financial instability, regulatory authorities should have a particular and well-justified interest in 
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ensuring financial stability (as highlighted by the Basel III Accord). 
As a result of the widespread implementation of the FSAP, stress tests are now broadly 
utilized. According to Borio et al. (2012), 13 micro and macro stress tests have four elements: 
the risk exposures subjected to stress; the scenario defining the shocks; the model mapping the 
shocks onto an outcome; and, the measure of the outcome. More specifically, the aim of stress 
testing is to measure the impact of severe shocks which are potentially able to harm financial 
stability. Hence, the results of stress testing are threefold: to add value to the internal control 
exercised by banks in the course of risk management; to serve as a basis for fostering prudential 
techniques of protection against adverse situations; and, to facilitate prevention, early warning 
and response tasks to deal with these adverse situations (see Marcelo et al. 2008).8  
As pointed out by Drehmann (2005), 14 stress testing models differ in terms of complexity 
and the risks considered. Despite many significant contributions to stress testing (e.g.: Elsinger 
et al., 2006; Jacobson et al.,2005; De Graeve et al., 2008; Pesaranet al.,2009; Aikman et al., 
2009),15-19 there is no consensus on the set of tools, or the best approach, to use. As a 
consequence of this various approaches have been proposed, including Wilson (1997a, 
1997b),20,21 Virolainen (2004),22 Sorge and Virolainen (2006),23 Misina et al. (2006),24 and 
Jimenez and Mencia (2009).25 Differences notwithstanding, the underlying structures assume a 
linear relationship between macroeconomic variables and the probability of default on the 
bank’s loan portfolio. 
Studies specific to China are sparser. Xu and Liu (2008)26 compare several popular macro 
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stress testing approaches and focus on the use of macro stress testing to estimate the stability 
of the financial system. Using a logit model, Ren and Sun (2007)27 estimate credit risk in the 
banking industry. For their part, Chen and Wu (2004)28 empirically investigate vulnerability of 
China’s banking system over the period 1978-2000. They uncover evidence to suggest that 
macroeconomic dynamics affect the bank’s stability via macroeconomic policies. 
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
In testing credit risk exposure in China’s banking system, we will begin by adopting the 
framework proposed by Wilson (1997a, 1997b), 20, 21 Boss (2002)29 and Virolainen (2004)22, i.e. 
estimating the relationship between credit risk and macroeconomic dynamics. Next, we employ 
the Monte Carlo simulation approach to examine the distribution of possible default rates for 
the scenario under investigation. 
We define 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑅𝑡  as the aggregate non-performing loan ratio of the whole banking 
system in China in period t. Since 0 ≤ 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑅𝑡 ≤ 1 we can employ its logit-transformed value 
(𝑦𝑡) instead of 𝑝𝑡 as the dependent variable.That is 
𝑦 𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛 {
1 − 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑅𝑡
𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑅𝑡
} 
After this canonical processing for the credit risk index (note here that –∞ <𝑦𝑡< +∞), it follows 
that the 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑅𝑡  is negatively related to𝑦𝑡, which means a higher 𝑦𝑡 indicates a better credit-
risk status, and vice versa. Further, preliminary (augmented Dickey-Fuller) unit-root tests with 
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the time trend and the intercept finds 𝑦𝑡 (our dependent variable) to be stationary. More 
specifically, 𝑦𝑡  dependents on its lags, and the n lagged values of the macroeconomic 
variables: 
𝑦𝑡 = α + 𝐴1𝑥𝑡−1 ··· +𝐴𝑛𝑥𝑡−𝑛 + 𝐵1𝑦𝑡−1 ··· +𝐵𝑛𝑦𝑡−𝑛 + ѵ𝑡                                             (1) 
where 𝑦𝑡  is a vector of endogenous variables and 𝑥𝑡 is a vector of exogenous variables. In this 
equation α is the vector of intercepts and 𝐴1 ··· 𝐴𝑛 are matrices of coefficients on the macro-
economic variable lagged 𝑛 times. The matrices of coefficients 𝐵1 ··· 𝐵𝑛 are associated with 
the lags on the dependent variable, and the disturbance term is given byѵ𝑡 , which may be 
contemporaneously correlated but are uncorrelated with their own lagged values and 
uncorrelated with all of the right-hand side variables. 
This macro-economic framework examines the dynamics of the macro-economic variables 
as well. Based on Wilson’s (1997a, 1997b), 20, 21 original specification, which every macro-
economic variable follows an autoregressive (AR) process, we generalize a more realistic 
dynamic process by adopting by the following specification: 
𝑥𝑡 = β + 𝐶1𝑥𝑡−1 ··· +𝐶𝑛𝑥𝑡−𝑛 + 𝐷1𝑦𝑡−1 ··· +𝐷𝑛𝑦𝑡−𝑛 + 𝜀𝑡                                                            (2) 
where β is the vector of intercepts; 𝐶1 ··· 𝐶𝑛 and 𝐷1 ··· 𝐷𝑛  are coefficient matrices; and  𝜀𝑡 
is a vector of disturbances. Following Wong et al. (2006)30 we recognize that macro-economic 
variables are mutually interdependent and equation (2) explicitly accounts for feedback effects 
of bank performances on the economy (the terms 𝐷1𝑦𝑡−1 ··· +𝐷𝑛𝑦𝑡−𝑛). Equation (1) and (2) 
together compose the framework to study the economic performance and the associated 
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financial stability indicators. 
In developing our model we aim to improve on the specification employed in Virolainen 
(2004)22 and Wilson (1997a, 1997b).20, 21 First, we employ a lag-effect of the macroeconomic 
variables to banks’ credit risk. Second, by allowing 𝑥𝑡to depend on𝑦𝑡−1, 𝑦𝑡−𝑠 this implies 
previous bank performances can influence the present macro economy.  
 Subsequently, we employ Monte Carlo simulations to generate the distribution of possible 
credit losses under the macroeconomic shock scenarios, which we can then compare with 
possible credit losses under the baseline scenario. Nevertheless, it is instructive to note that this 
approach has some limitations, such as the treatment of the contagion effect within the banking 
system. First, it is not unusual for central banks to use aggregate data when testing the change 
of credit risk in the regional banking system, based on the assumption that we move from top 
to bottom. However, the use of aggregate data when assessing credit risk in the whole banking 
system is equivalent to conducting micro stress testing with the aggregate data, and ignoring 
the structural problems within the financial system. Second, the adaptive response of banking 
institutions may generate a feedback effect. It is commonplace that in a number of the macro 
stress testing practices the initial shock effect from the macro economy to the banking system 
is small in the first period, while the risk effect will be significantly increased when the period 
of stress testing is prolonged. In other words, the change of risk factors in the first round should 
not be treated as the ultimate outcome and underscores the need to continually reassess the 
response behavior of the banking system to a (macroeconomic) shock.  
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4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
4.1. Variables description and data sources 
Following the framework discussed above, we adopt a macroeconomic credit risk model to 
estimate the relationship between macroeconomic variables and the non-performing loan ratio 
(NPLR) of the banking system covering the period from 2000Q1 to 2012Q3. Due to the 
importance of selecting the appropriate variables, Table 1 presents a brief summary of the 
variables considered in previous research, which then informs our choice of variables for China. 
Based on the aims of this research (and the reliability and availability of data), we will focus 
on eight major explanatory variables for China (see Table 2). 
 
Table 1: Summary of Macroeconomic variables employed in previous research 
Author(s) Geographical 
Location 
Macro variables 
Wong et al. (2006)30 Hong Kong Real GDP growth; Real GDP growth of Mainland 
China; Real interest rates (HIBOR); Real property 
prices. 
Bardsen et al. Norway Real GDP; Real household consumption; 
Unemployment; Consumer prices; Interest rate; House 
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(2006)31 prices. 
Bunn et al.  (2005)32 United Kingdom Interest rate; GDP; Output gap; Unemployment rate; 
Real exchange rate; Inflation rate; House price inflation 
rate. 
Misina et al. (2006)24  Canada GDP growth rate; Unemployment rate; Interest rate; 
Credit/GDP ratio. 
Virolainen (2004)22 Finland Nominal GDP growth; Interest rate; Exchange rate; 
M2; International balance of payment; Asset price. 
 
We identify three popular dependent variables typically considered in previous research, 
namely: the firm’s probabilities of default (PD) (see for example, Pesaran et al., 2006); 33 
corporate expected default frequencies (EDF) (see for example, Alves, 2005); 34 and, the 
balance sheet information of the bank (such as NPLR, capital adequacy ratios and liquidity). 
Compared to PD and EDFs, balance sheet information is a traditional measurement, but it is 
limited because balance sheet information is only available on a relatively low-frequency basis 
(quarterly and yearly). In contrast, the PD and EDF are available at a higher frequency, and 
they can be forward-looking. Due to the nature of China’s commercial banks, and the 
availability of relevant data, we employ NPLR as the measurable dependent variable pertaining 
to the balance sheet. According to the Loan Quality Assessment Guidelines (China Bank 
Regulatory Commission, 2005), 35 the NPLR is classified as the total of sub-loans, doubtful-
12 
 
loans and loss-loans divided by total loans. In other words, a higher NPLR implies a higher 
level of credit exposure. 
 
Table 2: Variable list 
Variable Description  
NPLR Non-performing Loan Ratio 
GDP  Nominal Gross Domestic Product Growth Rate 
RPI  Retail Price Index  
UNE  Unemployment Rate  
HPI House Price Index 
FIX Total Fixed Investment, nominal (%YOY) 
M2 Money Supply, M2 (%YOY) 
INT Interest Rate  
EX  Exchange rate, Chinese Yuan to US Dollar 
 
The eight explanatory macroeconomic variables (Table 2), including the GDP growth rate, 
the retail price index, the unemployment rate, a house price index, the money supply (M2), the 
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interest rate, exchange rate, and total fixed investment, can be placed into four categories to 
capture different kinds of potential shocks: 
1. The business cycle is measured by GDP growth, retail price index (for inflation), and 
the unemployment rate, as the stability of the macro-economy is the goal of a healthy 
financial system. A growing economy is likely to be associated with rising incomes 
and reduced financial distress. Therefore, GDP growth is negatively associated with 
the NPLR and unemployment is positively related with the NPLR. After maintaining 
high-growth for a number of years, the growth of China’s economy has slowed down 
somewhat, while inflation remains above the Government’s target. Thus, policy-
makers in China have been concerned with how to implement a successful “soft-
landing”, whilst dealing with inflation. 
2. Credit risk is measured by the interest rate, money supply (M2), and total fixed 
investment. Banks are still the major source of corporate and fixed investment in China, 
and the interest rate and credit quota have a direct impact on the credit exposure of the 
banks’ balance sheets. Otherwise, unlike their counterparts in developed countries, 
income from loans surprisingly makes more than 80 percent of the total profit of 
commercial banks in China. A hike in interest rates weakens borrowers’ debt servicing 
capacity, thus, NPLR is expected to be positively related with the interest rate. 
3. Property-value bubbles, which are measured by house price indexes, have triggered 
several financial crises, such as the Florida property bubble in late 1920s (White, 2009), 
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36 the depression of Japan since 1991 (Posen, 2003), 37 and the subprime lending crisis 
since March 2008. In China, the loans to the real estate sector have grown to RMB 
11.74 trillion in September 2012, an increase of approximately 12.1% since the end of 
2011 (Source: China Banking Regulatory Commission). Should this indicate a bubble 
this may create problems since real estate is a major item of collateral, and banks 
would be unwilling to service the debt should the value of real estate decline. 
4. Exchange rate risk is measured by the exchange rate (Chinese Yuan to US Dollar), 
which reflects the global macroeconomic environment. The fluctuation of the 
exchange rate might significantly affect the stability of the whole economy and output. 
An appreciation of the exchange rate can have mixed implications. On the one hand, 
it could weaken the competitiveness of export-oriented firms and adversely affect their 
ability to service their debt. On the other, it can improve the debt-servicing capacity of 
borrowers who borrow in foreign currency. 
These variables are initially chosen as macroeconomic factors by the R-squared values of the 
regressions. We have also tried some other macroeconomic variables like the consumer price 
index, producer price index, and stock market index, but find no additional explanatory power. 
 We source the NPLR data from the China Banking Regulatory Commission website and 
the Ruisi Statistical database. Other data used in this study are sourced from DataStream, the 
National Bureau of Statistics of China, and The People’s Bank of China. The summary 
descriptive statistics of data are presented in Table 3. 
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Table 3: Summary statistics, 2000Q1-2012Q3 
 
Prior to 2000 annual data was only available for some variables. The trend in the NPLR of 
the banking system in China had climbed to a peak in 1999, thereafter exhibiting a steady 
decline. In part this turning point may be explained by the establishment of an asset 
management corporation between 1999 and 2004, which was responsible for managing the bad 
assets of the four major state-owned commercial banks. Since these “big four” retained in 
excess of 60% of the total assets in the whole banking system, the concurrent injection by the 
Central Bank of a large amount of funds into these “big four” led to the overall NPLR dropping 
significantly.  
 NPLR GDP RPI UNE HPI FIX M2 INT EX 
Mean  11.22  9.77  1.51  4.02  4.93  19.58  12.08  6.37  7.59 
Median  7.53  9.60  1.20  4.10  4.30  21.15  12.15  6.21  8.02 
Maximum  29.18  14.80  7.56  4.30  12.19  37.40  19.54  7.83  8.28 
Minimum  0.90  6.60 -2.03  3.10 -1.10  5.39  7.07  5.76  6.29 
Std. Dev. 9.76 2.05 2.61 0.32 3.70 6.99 2.84 0.61 0.75 
Observations 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 
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 Results of our preliminary tests using the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) method (with 
trends and intercepts, testing the time series properties for all these variables) suggest that three 
of the macroeconomic series — specifically RPI, HPI, and M2— are stationary I (0). The other 
five variables — i.e. GDP, INT, EX, UNE and FIX — are first order stationary I (1). Because 
of this we use their first differences, DGDP, DINT, DEX, DUNE and DFIX in the regression. 
 
Table 4: ADF unit root tests 
Variable t-Statistic Unit root test result 
GDP -1.88* GDP~I(1), DGDP 
RPI -3.67 RPI ~I(0) 
UNE -2.75* UNE ~I(1), DUNE 
HPI -3.48 HPI ~I(0) 
FIX -0.89* FIX ~I(1), DFIX 
M2 -7.31 M2~I(0) 
INT -2.69* INT ~I(1), DINT 
EX -2.12* EX ~I(1), DEX 
* Non-rejection of the null of non-stationarity at 10% 
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Following Lutkepohl (1993)38 we focus on the Akaike (AIC), Hannan-Quinn (HQ) and 
Schwarz (SC) criteria for the selection of the lag lengths in our VAR model. Given the sample 
size, and the nature of the quarterly data, the results of the Akaike information criterion, 
Schwarz information criterion, and Hannan-Quinn information criterion all suggest a 4 period 
lag length (see Appendix). 
 
4.2 Discussion of results 
In this section we adopt a VAR framework that links the credit risk measurement of the banking 
system to the macroeconomic variables (outlined in Table 2) which reflect the situation of the 
macro economy. In our VAR framework we assume that vulnerability in the banking system 
can be affected by the general economic conditions, and there is a potential feedback effect 
which allows stress in the banking system to impact the macro economy. Unlike simple linear 
regression, the order of variables in VAR should be arranged according to the speed of reaction 
to a particular shock. Therefore, our variable ordering is such that the variables related to the 
business cycle — such as GDP, RPI and unemployment rate — were located after NPLR, 
because the business cycle affects the banking system after a lag. Consequently, interest rates 
and the exchange rate were ordered at the bottom of the VAR. 
 As the VAR results show in Table 5, most of the signs of the coefficients of the variables 
are as expected and consistent with other studies (see Wong et al., 200630 and Shen and Feng, 
201039). Thus 𝑦𝑡is positively related to the lag effects on GDP growth and the unemployment 
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rate due to the fact that when the economy enjoys steady growth with a low unemployment rate, 
the banking system can share the benefit as the financial intermediary. Meanwhile, 𝑦𝑡  is 
negatively related to the lag of RPI and the money supply, albeit via comparatively weak 
correlations which are below expectation.  
Between 2003 and 2007 China’s economy experienced a significant cyclical upswing, with 
vigorous financing demand leading to a tremendous influx of funding into production. The 
onset of the GFC around 2008Q2 adversely impacted international trade. On the one hand, 
banks provided more loans to firms to avoid their potential default. On the other hand, the 
government employed easy monetary policy to ensure smooth growth. As a consequence, 
default rates remained stable, while the inflation rate and money supply increased significantly.  
 
                   Table 5: Vector Autoregression Estimates 
 𝐲𝐭 DGDP RPI DUNE HPI DFIX M2 DINT DEX 
yt (-1) 
0.96*** 
(-0.27) 
-4.70* 
(-2.64) 
-2.75 
(-2.25) 
0.16 
(-0.12) 
-5.63** 
(-2.49) 
0.08 
(-9.81) 
3.11 
(-4.18) 
-0.70 
(-0.54) 
0.01 
(-0.18) 
yt (-2) 
0.39 
(-0.35) 
2.51 
(-3.44) 
-2.90 
(-2.93) 
0.11 
(-0.16) 
3.14 
(-3.24) 
-0.77 
(-12.81) 
1.35 
(-5.46) 
0.34 
(-0.70) 
0.12 
(-0.23) 
yt (-3) -0.66** 5.31* 3.67 -0.18 4.86 2.81 -8.02 1.34** -0.11 
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 𝐲𝐭 DGDP RPI DUNE HPI DFIX M2 DINT DEX 
(-0.32) (-3.12) (-2.66) (-0.15) (-2.94) (-11.62) (-4.95) (-0.64) (-0.21) 
yt (-4) 
0.27 
(-0.30) 
-3.21 
(-2.95) 
1.75 
(-2.51) 
-0.03 
(-0.14) 
-3.28 
(-2.78) 
-0.74 
(-10.96) 
4.39 
(-4.67) 
-0.97 
(-0.60) 
-0.04 
(-0.20) 
DGDP(-1) 
0.10** 
(-0.04) 
-0.76* 
(-0.44) 
0.11 
(-0.37) 
-0.04* 
(-0.02) 
0.52 
(-0.41) 
-3.26** 
(-1.62) 
0.24 
(-0.69) 
-0.07 
(-0.09) 
0.03 
(-0.03) 
DGDP(-2) 
0.10* 
(-0.06) 
-0.44 
(-0.58) 
0.37 
(-0.49) 
-0.05* 
(-0.03) 
0.78 
(-0.54) 
-4.41** 
(-2.14) 
-0.04 
(-0.91) 
-0.12 
(-0.12) 
0.03 
(-0.04) 
DGDP(-3) 
0.02 
(-0.05) 
-0.44 
(-0.53) 
0.74 
(-0.45) 
-0.05* 
(-0.03) 
0.85 
(-0.50) 
-3.40* 
(-1.98) 
-0.35 
(-0.85) 
-0.04 
(-0.11) 
0.00 
(-0.04) 
DGDP(-4) 
0.06 
(-0.06 
-0.17 
(-0.63) 
0.35 
(-0.54) 
-0.05 
(-0.03) 
-0.29 
(-0.59) 
-3.17 
(-2.34) 
0.49 
(-1.00) 
-0.19 
(-0.13) 
0.01 
(-0.04) 
RPI(-1) 
-0.02 
(-0.04 
-0.35 
(-0.44) 
0.33 
(-0.37) 
-0.03 
(-0.02) 
0.19 
(-0.41) 
1.06 
(-1.63) 
-0.52 
(-0.69) 
0.11 
(-0.09) 
0.04 
(-0.03) 
RPI(-2) 
0.09 
(-0.06) 
-0.49 
(-0.63) 
0.22 
(-0.53) 
-0.05 
(-0.03) 
-0.13 
(-0.59) 
-3.42 
(-2.33) 
-0.07 
(-0.99) 
-0.19 
(-0.13) 
0.01 
(-0.04) 
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 𝐲𝐭 DGDP RPI DUNE HPI DFIX M2 DINT DEX 
RPI(-3) 
0.06 
(-0.04 
-0.39 
(-0.40) 
0.20 
(-0.34) 
0.01 
(-0.02) 
-0.42 
(-0.38) 
-2.89* 
(-1.49) 
0.13 
(-0.64) 
-0.06 
(-0.08) 
0.03 
(-0.03) 
RPI(-4) 
-0.07* 
(-0.04) 
0.41 
(-0.39) 
0.14 
(-0.33) 
0.02 
(-0.02) 
0.65* 
(-0.37) 
0.07 
(-1.45) 
-0.20 
(-0.62) 
-0.01 
(-0.08) 
-0.04 
(-0.03) 
DUNE(-1) 
1.12** 
(-0.55) 
-10.48* 
(-5.42) 
1.89 
(-4.62) 
-0.34 
(-0.25) 
-3.86 
(-5.11) 
-19.03 
(-20.16) 
-3.61 
(-8.59) 
-2.08* 
(-1.10) 
0.11 
(-0.36) 
DUNE(-2) 
0.83* 
(-0.48) 
-10.30** 
(-4.69) 
3.18 
(-3.99) 
-0.11 
(-0.22) 
-0.53 
(-4.41) 
-19.79 
(-17.42) 
-0.43 
(-7.43) 
-2.03** 
(-0.95) 
-0.09 
(-0.31) 
DUNE(-3) 
0.82* 
(-0.44) 
-7.65* 
(-4.34) 
1.57 
(-3.69) 
-0.13 
(-0.20) 
-3.65 
(-4.09) 
-19.70 
(-16.14) 
-1.93 
(-6.88) 
-1.59* 
(-0.88) 
0.04 
(-0.29) 
DUNE(-4) 
0.95** 
(-0.37) 
-2.21 
(-3.61) 
2.76 
(-3.08) 
0.58*** 
(-0.17) 
8.00** 
(-3.40) 
-9.10 
(-13.43) 
-3.83 
(-5.73) 
-1.40* 
(-0.74) 
-0.02 
(-0.24) 
HPI(-1) 
-0.03 
(-0.03) 
0.02 
(-0.30) 
0.10 
(-0.25) 
0.03* 
(-0.01) 
0.90*** 
(-0.28) 
0.89 
(-1.11) 
-0.13 
(-0.47) 
0.00 
(-0.06) 
-0.02 
(-0.02) 
HPI(-2) 0.03 -0.04 -0.08 -0.01 -0.12 0.04 0.19 0.00 0.00 
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 𝐲𝐭 DGDP RPI DUNE HPI DFIX M2 DINT DEX 
(-0.03) (-0.30) (-0.26) (-0.01) (-0.28) (-1.12) (-0.48) (-0.06) (-0.02) 
HPI(-3) 
-0.01 
(-0.03) 
-0.03 
(-0.26) 
-0.07 
(-0.22) 
0.01 
(-0.01) 
0.05 
(-0.24) 
-0.45 
(-0.96) 
0.00 
(-0.41) 
0.00 
(-0.05) 
0.00 
(-0.02) 
HPI(-4) 
0.02 
(-0.02) 
0.01 
(-0.17) 
0.13 
(-0.15) 
-0.02** 
(-0.01) 
-0.15 
(-0.16) 
0.69 
(-0.65) 
-0.13 
(-0.28) 
0.01 
(-0.04) 
0.00 
(-0.01) 
DFIX(-1) 
-0.02* 
(-0.01) 
0.07 
(-0.12) 
0.17 
(-0.10) 
0.01 
(-0.01) 
0.12 
(-0.12) 
-0.64 
(-0.46) 
0.08 
(-0.19) 
0.01 
(-0.02) 
-0.01 
(-0.01) 
DFIX(-2) 
-0.03** 
(-0.02) 
0.16 
(-0.16) 
0.04 
(-0.13) 
0.01* 
(-0.01) 
0.00 
(-0.15) 
-0.31 
(-0.58) 
-0.04 
(-0.25) 
0.02 
(-0.03) 
-0.01 
(-0.01) 
DFIX(-3) 
0.01 
(-0.02) 
0.08 
(-0.15) 
-0.11 
(-0.13) 
0.02** 
(-0.01) 
-0.12 
(-0.14) 
-0.06 
(-0.56) 
0.30 
(-0.24) 
-0.03 
(-0.03) 
0.00 
(-0.01) 
DFIX(-4) 
-0.03 
(-0.02) 
0.15 
(-0.19) 
-0.06 
(-0.16) 
0.01 
(-0.01) 
0.22 
(-0.18) 
0.51 
(-0.72) 
-0.10 
(-0.31) 
0.07* 
(-0.04) 
-0.01 
(-0.01) 
M2(-1) 
0.00 
(-0.02 
-0.26 
(-0.18 
0.08 
(-0.15) 
-0.01 
(-0.01) 
-0.02 
(-0.17) 
-0.06 
(-0.67) 
0.05 
(-0.28) 
0.01 
(-0.04) 
0.00 
(-0.01) 
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 𝐲𝐭 DGDP RPI DUNE HPI DFIX M2 DINT DEX 
M2(-2) 
0.02 
(-0.02) 
0.06 
(-0.19) 
0.22 
(-0.16) 
-0.01 
(-0.01) 
0.14 
(-0.18) 
-0.78 
(-0.71) 
0.55* 
(-0.30) 
-0.05 
(-0.04) 
0.01 
(-0.01) 
M2(-3) 
0.02 
(-0.02) 
0.21 
(-0.18) 
0.24 
(-0.16) 
0.00 
(-0.01) 
0.33* 
(-0.17) 
-0.32 
(-0.68) 
0.36 
(-0.29) 
-0.02 
(-0.04) 
-0.01 
(-0.01) 
M2(-4) 
-0.04** 
(-0.02) 
0.20 
(-0.17) 
0.09 
(-0.15) 
0.01 
(-0.01) 
0.13 
(-0.16) 
0.16 
(-0.64) 
-0.43 
(-0.27) 
0.06* 
(-0.04) 
-0.01 
(-0.01) 
DINT(-1) 
-0.10 
(-0.22) 
-2.26 
(-2.17) 
-0.54 
(-1.84) 
0.15 
(-0.10) 
-1.71 
(-2.04) 
9.72 
(-8.05) 
-0.54 
(-3.43) 
0.19 
(-0.44) 
-0.16 
(-0.15) 
DINT(-2) 
0.14 
(-0.17) 
-1.40 
(-1.69) 
-2.10 
(-1.44) 
0.17** 
(-0.08) 
-2.80* 
(-1.59) 
2.13 
(-6.28) 
2.47 
(-2.68) 
-0.58 
(-0.34) 
-0.04 
(-0.11) 
DINT(-3) 
-0.29 
(-0.22) 
1.88 
(-2.16) 
-0.42 
(-1.84) 
0.12 
(-0.10) 
0.90 
(-2.04) 
8.41 
(-8.04) 
-3.96 
(-3.43) 
0.78 
(-0.44) 
-0.10 
(-0.14) 
DINT(-4) 
-0.26* 
(-0.12 
-0.79 
(-1.22) 
-0.65 
(-1.04) 
0.11* 
(-0.06) 
-0.83 
(-1.15) 
0.39 
(-4.55) 
1.15 
(-1.94) 
0.10 
(-0.25) 
-0.04 
(-0.08) 
DEX(-1) -1.18* 3.82 -4.21 0.16 -4.08 -6.49 -8.58 1.35 -0.26 
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 𝐲𝐭 DGDP RPI DUNE HPI DFIX M2 DINT DEX 
(-0.65) (-6.35) (-5.41) (-0.30) (-5.99) (-23.63) (-10.07) (-1.29) (-0.43) 
DEX(-2) 
-1.19* 
(-0.69) 
-2.02 
(-6.75) 
-0.83 
(-5.75) 
0.23 
(-0.32) 
8.79 
(-6.36) 
-0.27 
(-25.10) 
-4.27 
(-10.70) 
0.85 
(-1.37) 
-0.22 
(-0.45) 
DEX(-3) 
0.18 
(-0.78) 
-2.65 
(-7.67) 
-2.49 
(-6.53) 
-0.21 
(-0.36) 
-7.53 
(-7.23) 
-35.22 
(-28.53) 
10.37 
(-12.16) 
-0.15 
(-1.56) 
0.57 
(-0.51) 
DEX(-4) 
-0.01 
(-0.84) 
6.50 
(-8.21) 
5.43 
(-6.99) 
0.17 
(-0.39) 
2.49 
(-7.74) 
-27.69 
(-30.54) 
-9.97 
(-13.02) 
-0.52 
(-1.67) 
0.31 
(-0.55) 
C 
-0.20 
(-0.29) 
0.60 
(-2.83) 
-6.33*** 
(-2.41) 
-0.07 
(-0.13) 
-2.73 
(-2.66) 
8.35 
(-10.52) 
4.45 
(-4.48) 
0.27 
(-0.58) 
0.26 
(-0.19) 
 R-squared 1.00 0.86 0.98 0.90 0.99 0.78 0.92 0.88 0.78 
 Adj. R-squared 0.99 0.29 0.88 0.48 0.93 -0.10 0.59 0.38 -0.09 
 Sum sq. resids 0.10 9.93 7.20 0.02 8.82 137.36 24.95 0.41 0.04 
 S.E. equation 0.11 1.05 0.89 0.05 0.99 3.91 1.67 0.21 0.07 
 F-statistic 175.12 1.52 9.88 2.14 17.05 0.89 2.77 1.76 0.90 
 Log likelihood 75.12 -30.02 -22.62 110.75 -27.27 -90.43 -51.20 43.21 94.30 
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 𝐲𝐭 DGDP RPI DUNE HPI DFIX M2 DINT DEX 
 Akaike AIC -1.66 2.91 2.59 -3.21 2.79 5.54 3.83 -0.27 -2.49 
 Schwarz SC -0.19 4.38 4.06 -1.74 4.27 7.01 5.31 1.20 -1.02 
 Mean dependent 2.81 -0.02 1.83 0.01 5.32 -0.14 11.93 0.01 -0.04 
 S.D. dependent 1.27 1.25 2.55 0.07 3.68 3.73 2.59 0.27 0.07 
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively;  
standard errors in ( ). 
 
Regarding interest rates, a rise in interest rates implies an increase in the financing cost of 
loans. In particular, small firms which needed money to survive the crisis could not afford the 
financing cost, and failed to return their earlier loans. In addition, exchange rates have a strong 
negative correlation with the default rate for particular types of firms. Thus, the depreciation of 
RMB had negative impacts on three types of industries: industries whose raw materials are 
imported; second, those industries which maintain a huge amount of foreign exchange liabilities; 
and, third, the tourism industry. 
Interestingly, in our study we do not find a significant relationship between default rate 
and real estate price though, intuitively, one would expect this to be the case. The prolonged 
impacts on the default rate are captured by the lags i.e. DGDP(t-1): (0.09), DGDP(t-2): (0.10), 
RPI(t-4): (-0.07), DUNE(t-1): (1.12), DUNE(t-2): (0.83), DUNE(t-3): (0.82), DUNE(t-4): 
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(0.95), DFIX(t-1): (-0.02), DFIX(t-2): (-0.03), M2(t-4): (-0.04), DINT(t-4): (-0.26), DEX(t-1): 
(-1.18), and DEX(t-2): (-1.19). Moreover, the coefficient of the lagged default rate, yt(t-1): 
(0.96) and yt(t-3): (-0.66), are significant. This finding indicates that the expected default rate 
of banks in the past period would generate a prolonged impact on the NPLR in the current 
period. In other words, a one percentage point increase of the NPLR in the previous quarter will 
lead to a NPLR increase of 0.96 percentage points in the current quarter, which indicates that 
the impact of shocks are long-lasting. Because the signs of the coefficients of yt(t-1) and yt(t-
3) are different, it implies that the response of the banking system towards shocks is slow, 
possibly due to the time needed for implementing risk solutions. Meanwhile, this finding 
suggests that it is necessary for the regulators to launch a risk early warning system to identify 
the potential shocks, and the real shocks, at an early stage. This is because it is too late when 
the impact of the shock appears on the banks’ balance sheet. The fact that negative 
autocorrelation of yt(t-3) is different from the previous research (Shen and Feng, 2010)
39 may 
be attributed to the differences in frequency of data. However, we posit that the quarterly data 
we employ is likely to be more informative. Given the autocorrelation of𝑦𝑡, it is necessary to 
analyze the progress of the default rate over a time horizon that is longer than the duration of 
the designed shock in order to reflect the long-term impact of the shock. 
In addition to the aforementioned analysis, we conduct impulse response analysis in order 
to simulate shocks to the macro-economy, and estimate the feedback from these shocks to the 
NPLR. We are also able to estimate whether the changes in the NPLR have a further impact on 
macroeconomic developments. In the VAR approach, because of the lag structure, a shock on 
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one variable not only impacts the variable itself, but also affect all of the other endogenous 
variables. Therefore, the impulse response function is used to explore the effect of a one-time 
shock to one of the innovations on current and future values of the endogenous variables. 
Following the traditional VAR literature, the impulse response analysis is accomplished by 
means of the orthogonalised impulse responses with Cholesky decomposition. Our impulse 
response functions suggest that the default rate increases to 0.08 over three quarters, following 
unexpected shocks to GDP, and reverts to a lower level in the fourth quarter. Unexpected shocks 
in the RPI result in a decrease in the default rate, with an effect potentially lasting more than 25 
quarters. The response to a positive shock on real estate prices is not obvious during the first 
four quarters, and the impulse response of 𝑦𝑡 climbs to a peak of 0.25 from the fifth period to 
the twentieth. This can provide an explanation for why we failed to find a significant coefficient 
for real estate price in the credit risk model, because the impact of shocks to house prices can 
only be observed after four quarters, while the model estimates the lag value of the 
macroeconomic dynamics for four periods. However, when there is an innovation shock of one 
standard error for the unemployment rate, fixed investment, money supply, interest rate and the 
exchange rate respectively, there are no significant changes in𝑦𝑡.  
 
4.3. Scenario Analyses  
In the previous analysis we examined the relationships between the NPLR and key 
macroeconomic variables. In this section we aim to examine the response of the expected 
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default rate to macroeconomic shocks, via simulations. To generate the future path of the 
expected default rate, our scenario analysis conducts a stress test on the banking system in 
China, with historical and hypothetical scenario methods. The historical scenario method 
provides limited insight since China has maintained high growth for over two decades without 
suffering severe shocks. Given this, we seek to gain insight by mimicking the effects of the 
Asian Financial Crisis in 1998, and the Argentinean Financial Crisis (1999-2002), using the 
parameter estimates for the Chinese economy derived in the previous subsection. On the other 
hand, as uncertainty is the nature of hypothetical scenarios, we assume the macro risk factors 
follow the normal distribution and choose the1/10, 1/25, and 1/100 quantiles as the shock values, 
reflecting a 10-year, 25-year, and 100-year shock. These changes are modelled to occur 
separately from 2012Q4 to 2013Q2, from the moderate situation to the severe case, and there 
is no further artificial shock introduced for the subsequent quarters. We conduct the following 
out-of-sample forecast by step-by-step method. In every forecasting period, the model is re-
calculated with the new available data of variables of scenarios and generates the forecasted 
value of financial stability indicator for the next period. Given the macroeconomic variables 
we have selected, we design four scenarios as follows: (i) The benchmark scenario, in which 
there is no shock; (ii) shocks via the business cycle, in which China’s GDP growth rate slides 
to 7%, 6%, and 5% respectively in each of the three consecutive quarters (starting from 
2012Q4); (iii) a rise in the interest rate by 300, 400, and 500 basis points respectively in each 
of the three consecutive quarters starting from 2012Q4; (iv) rises in the exchange rate by 5%, 
10%, and 15% respectively in each of the three consecutive quarters starting from 2012Q4. 
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Since stress testing focuses on extreme, but plausible shocks, we have designed the 
scenarios with a feasible probability such that these changes in the macroeconomic variables 
can occur. Furthermore, these scenarios reflect extreme situations which can bring large losses 
to the banking system. In addition, we have designed a worsening trend for shocks, as economic 
stimulus policies may not be effective immediately. Then we simulate 2000 future paths and 
compute the expected default rates in 2013Q4 to construct a frequency distribution. With this 
frequency distribution, we can examine whether the banking system is stable within a certain 
confidence level, because the tails of the distributions provide insight into the extreme losses. 
 
Table 6: Stress-Testing Results for Scenarios 
Period Benchmark  GDP Shock  Interest Rate Shock  Exchange Rate Shock  
 yt NPLR (%) yt NPLR (%) yt NPLR (%) yt NPLR (%) 
2012 Q4 4.34 1.29 4.34 1.28 4.34 1.29 4.34 1.29 
2013 Q1 4.14 1.57 4.09 1.63 4.14 1.57 3.04 4.54 
2013 Q2 3.98 1.83 3.71 2.93 3.98 1.83 0.99 27.15 
2013 Q3 4.20 1.48 3.62 2.58 4.34 1.28 0.46 38.76 
 
The default rates in the following three periods after the shocks (2013Q1, 2013Q2, and 2013Q3) 
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were computed with the macroeconomic risk (VAR) model on a step-by-step basis. The results 
of this are outlined in Table 6. The following are noteworthy: 
1. The benchmark scenario: As that there is no shock in this scenario, the default rates (yt) 
are stable at about 4.17. Consequently, the NPLR for the whole banking system peaks 
at 1.83%, indicating very stable conditions for the banking system.  
2. The GDP shock scenario: Following the shock, the default rates in this scenario 
respond strongly to the change in GDP growth and the unemployment rate. The NPLR 
rises to 2.93% in 2013Q2, and falls down to 2.58% in 2013Q3. Accordingly, the 
influence of this business cycle shock on financial stability is profound, which would 
lead to an increase in provision for bad loans, and a concurrent decrease in capital 
adequacy. Even though China’s growth has all the hallmarks of a successful soft-
landing in the past three years, the banking system is still vulnerable in the face of such 
a GDP shock.  
3. The interest rate shock scenario: In this scenario we found a limited response in the 
relationship between the default rate and changes in the interest rate with the NPLR 
being raised to 1.83% in 2013Q2. Subsequently the NPLR falls to 1.28% in 2013Q3. 
This result suggests that the major clients of banks (big corporations and state-owned-
enterprises) are not sensitive to the financing cost of debt. 
4. The exchange rate shock scenario. Recall that some industries — such as those whose 
raw materials are imported, those which maintain a huge amount of foreign exchange 
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liabilities, and the tourism industry — can be profoundly affected by exchange rate 
shocks. It is of particular note that the strongest influence occurs in the exchange rate 
shock scenario, since the NPLR rockets to 27.15% in 2013Q2, and keeps rising to a 
more severe 38.76% in 2013Q3. This will likely lead to significant losses for banks and 
indicates that China’s government should be cautious in exchange rate reform. 
 
Building on this, we generate a conditional probability distribution of losses based on the 
concept of value-at-risk. This process is as follows: first, as reported in Table 7, we compute 
the response of the default rate with macroeconomic credit risk model and the Monte Carlo 
simulation (computed 2000 times); secondly, corresponding default rates are used to assess loss 
distributions.  
 
Table 7: Loss Distribution Scenarios, A Quarterly Horizon 
 Benchmark GDP Shock Interest Rate Shock Exchange Rate Shock 
     
Confidence Level (%) yt NPLR (%) yt NPLR (%) yt NPLR (%) yt NPLR (%) 
80 4.35 1.28 3.65 2.53 4.42 1.18 1.37 20.14 
90 4.27 1.38 3.57 2.74 4.34 1.29 1.25 22.29 
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95 4.19 1.49 3.49 2.93 4.27 1.37 1.16 23.94 
99 4.06 1.69 3.37 3.32 4.12 1.59 0.97 27.54 
 
 These loss distributions, again, include a benchmark scenario and three stressed scenarios. 
Generally, the value-at-risk results show that for the confidence level of 99%, the banking 
system in China is able to maintain the financial stability with an interest rate shock, with an 
acceptable NPLR of less than 2%. According to ‘the Core Indicators for the Risk Management 
of Commercial Banks’ (China Banking Regulatory Commission 2005), this indicates that the 
current risk from interest rate changes is moderate for the banking system. However, for the 
GDP shock and exchange rate shock our results suggest that with an 80% confidence level the 
NPLR exceeds the 2% threshold in each case. Our study suggests that an exchange rate shock 
is likely to be profoundly damaging in terms of the NPLR, exceeding 20% at each confidence 
level tested. The results shown in Table 7 do not contradict the previous step-by-step forecasting 
methods, though there are some differences in magnitude which can be explained by the 
differences in the methodological approach used. Overall, however, we would assert that this 
triangulates our result. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
This paper has developed a framework for macro stress-testing of credit risk for the banking 
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system in China. This framework was used to measure the financial stability of the banking 
system in response to shocks in different macroeconomic variables. We utilized VAR models 
and analyzed eight macroeconomic variables, with the macroeconomic credit risk models 
successfully explaining the impact of severe macroeconomic shocks on the balance sheet of 
banks. The analysis suggests that there are some significant relationships between the default 
rates and macroeconomic factors, such as GDP growth, the unemployment rate, the interest rate, 
and the exchange rate, which are focal concerns for macro stress testing perspectives. 
Macro stress-testing is used to assess the financial stability of the banking system. We 
combined the historical method and the hypothetical method to produce three stress scenarios 
with various artificial shocks including GDP growth shocks, interest rate shocks, and exchange 
rate shocks. Thereafter, the distribution of possible NPLRs, derived from the Monte Carlo 
method, was simulated, and the value-at-risk for credit risk was calculated. The results indicate 
that the banking system in China would be healthy in the case of interest rate shocks, but in the 
case of GDP growth and exchange rate shocks the NPLR of banks would climb beyond the 
limit of 2%. 
Although from a macro prudential perspective China emerged unscathed from the GFC, 
the Central Bank of China should learn the lessons of risk management from Western countries 
and encourage commercial banks to carry out both micro stress-testing and macro stress-testing 
under the framework of FSAP. For the policy makers, they should pay more attention to the 
stress testing results during the decision-making process, especially when formulating growth 
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and exchange rate policies. In particular, the ongoing foreign exchange rate system reform is 
something that needs to be considered carefully so that China can avoid severe exchange rate 
shocks, which our study suggests would be extremely costly. Our results also provide helpful 
suggestions to policymakers in China in monetary policy formulation. The empirical results 
indicate that the interest rate and money supply have significant effects on the stability of the 
banking system in China. Therefore, applying the interest rate and the reserve requirement ratio 
is useful for China to achieve financial stability. In practice, when the economy slows, the 
policymaker could decrease the interest rate and the reserve requirement ratio to stimulate the 
economy. When the economy is booming, the policymaker could increase the interest rate and 
the reserve requirement ratio to suppress the economy and reserve certain capital buffer for 
potential shocks to banking sector. 
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APPENDIX: Lag Length Criteria 
Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
0 -458.59 NA   0.005  20.33  20.69  20.46 
1 -189.38  421.38  1.62e-06  12.15  15.72  13.49 
2 -105.09  98.94  2.12e-06  12.00  18.80  14.55 
3  36.86  111.10  5.46e-07  9.35  19.37  13.11 
4  580.04   212.55*   4.35e-14*  -10.74*   2.49*  -5.78* 
* Indicates lag order selected by the criterion 
LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level) 
FPE: Final prediction error 
AIC: Akaike information criterion 
SC: Schwarz information criterion 
HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion 
 
